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Paradigm Case Arguments 
 
From time to time philosophers and scientists have made sensational, provocative 
claims that certain things do not exist or never happen that, in everyday life, we 
unquestioningly take for granted as existing or happening. These claims have included 
denying the existence of matter, space, time, the self, free will, and other sturdy and 
basic elements of our common-sense or naïve world-view. Around the middle of the 
twentieth century an argument was developed that can be used to challenge many such 
skeptical claims based on linguistic considerations, which came to be known as the 
Paradigm Case Argument (henceforth, the PCA). 
 
Consider, for instance, the following argument from a skeptic who denies that there are 
cases of seeing people. First, it cannot be said that we see the people who walk our 
streets, since they are mostly covered with clothes. All that we see, strictly speaking, 
are their faces and hands. But to see any such people stripped naked would be little 
better, since we then would be seeing only their facing surfaces while only imagining 
or anticipating, not seeing, their rear sides. With well-placed mirrors we might be able 
to see all their sides at once, but we are still seeing only their exterior, which does not 
constitute the whole person. No, to see these people proper we would need to have them 
opened up, with all their interior parts displayed for us too. But then we would no longer 
have a person, but a corpse or a display of people-parts. Hence there are no cases of 
seeing people. 
 
A philosopher using the PCA could then counter this by pointing out that it is in fact a 
perfectly natural and proper use of the word ‘see’ to say that you see a person in 
ordinary cases where you are looking at a fully intact person with his or her clothes on. 
She might then, if necessary, describe situations where we do or would say this. She 
might point out that we teach or train children and also adults who are learning English 
how to use the expression ‘see a person’ with reference to everyday cases when one 
sees them clothed. (Teacher: ‘What do you see on page seven?’ Learner: ‘A person.’ 
Teacher: ‘That’s correct.’)  These are paradigm cases of seeing people, exemplars that 
we use when teaching and explaining the meaning of that expression. That being so, 
there is no logical room for a philosophical argument showing that these are not cases 
of seeing people. Trying to argue that they are not would be like trying to argue that the 
paintings of Picasso that the term ‘cubism’ was coined to denote are not cubist (because 
they do not depict geometrically exact cubes, say). 
 
This article shows the PCA being applied to the more controversial topic of free will 
skepticism, examines its logical structure, and looks at some common objections to it. 
The appraisal of the PCA leads to issues of some depth and importance. 
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1. History and Significance of the Argument 
The PCA is closely associated with the linguistic philosophy movement that peaked in 
the mid-twentieth century, when many philosophers were urging that philosophical 
questions and problems should be approached by paying careful attention to the 
language that we use for expressing them. More specifically, it was associated with 
the ordinary language philosophy approach within that broader movement, where the 
emphasis was on examining the ordinary use of terms. Both advocates and critics of the 
PCA have claimed that it is foundational to those philosophical outlooks and key to 
understanding them (for example, Flew 1966, p. 261; Gellner 1959, pp. 30–32; Parker-
Ryan 2010, p. 123). 
 
The first explicit presentation of the PCA was in a classic paper of the ordinary language 
philosophy tradition by Norman Malcolm, originally published in 1942, called ‘Moore 
and Ordinary Language’ (also see Malcolm 1963). Malcolm studied under and was 
influenced by G. E. Moore and Ludwig Wittgenstein at Cambridge. He then returned 
to the USA and became a leading exponent of Wittgenstein’s philosophy there. He 
believed that the PCA was inchoate in Moore’s famous ‘proof’ (1939) of an external 
world, and he also stated (1963, p. 183) that grasping it was essential for understanding 
some of Wittgenstein’s most distinctive remarks on the nature of philosophy, such as, 
‘Philosophy must not interfere in any way with the actual use of language, so it can in 
the end only describe it. For it cannot justify it either. It leaves everything as it is’ 
(Wittgenstein 2009/1953, §124). Anthony Flew was another prominent early exponent 
of the PCA, who applied and defended it in a series of articles beginning in the 1950s. 
 
The argument was employed by Malcolm, Flew, and others to defend the existence of 
a variety of things from skeptical attack, such as cases of acting freely (Black 1958; 
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Danto 1959; Flew 1954 & 1955a; Hanfling 1990; Hardie 1957), causation (Black 
1958), solidity (Stebbing 1937; Urmson 1953), space and time (Malcolm 1992/1942), 
material things and perceptions of material things (Malcolm 1992/1942; 1963), and 
certain knowledge of empirical propositions (Malcolm 1992/1942). For convenience, 
in what follows people who argue against the existence of such things are called 
‘skeptics’, and people who use the PCA to counter such arguments are called 
‘defenders’. 
 
 
2. Paradigm Cases 
The PCA exploits the idea of a paradigm case. Minimally, a paradigm case of 
something is a case that is supposed to come within the denotation or extension of the 
relevant word. But what is more, it is supposed to centrally come within its denotation; 
it is supposed to be a model example or exemplar, something about which we are 
inclined to say, ‘That’s an X if anything is’ or ‘If that’s not an X, I don’t know what is’. 
It is the kind of case that psychologists who study concepts would call a ‘prototypical 
category member’ and which has been found to be associated with various 
psychological phenomena, such as tending to first spring to mind when people are told 
to think of examples of an X, or being more rapidly categorized as an X compared to 
other category members in categorization tasks. This exemplar status makes it 
especially fit for the purpose of explaining the meaning of the relevant word in 
ostensive definitions (and its being used for that purpose reinforces its exemplar status 
in turn). 
 
A particularly striking example of a paradigm case in this sense (an exemplar of an 
exemplar, if you will) might be the International Prototype of the Kilogram, a lump of 
platinum kept in Paris that was used to define what a kilogram is, such that anything 
else was a kilogram in weight if and only if it was the same weight as this object. The 
cases that the defender refers to as paradigm Xs are thought of as playing a similar 
meaning-setting role in relation to the relevant term ‘X’ (though this comparison has its 
limits; for example, the cases might not have come to play that role through explicit 
stipulation or formal decision). The problem, then, that the defender has with the skeptic 
is that in denying that there are any Xs, the skeptic seems to be denying that what 
apparently are paradigm cases of Xs are Xs, which would be analogous to denying that 
the International Prototype of the Kilogram is a kilogram in weight. 
 
 
3. The PCA as Part of a Wider Response to the Skeptic 
Of course, when the skeptic denies that there are any Xs, he does so due to some reasons 
or arguments. The PCA, however, does not directly engage with the arguments that the 
skeptic gives or the significant complexities they can give rise to. This is because, from 
the defender’s perspective, the skeptic’s claims can ‘be seen to be false in advance of 
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an examination of the arguments adduced in support of them’ (Malcolm 1963, p. 181; 
also see Malcolm 1992/1942, p. 114), since the PCA is supposed to show that the 
skeptical claim must be wrong. In other words, for the defender, the skeptical argument 
(assuming it is logically valid) should be regarded as a reductio ad absurdum of a 
premise in the argument, since it leads to an absurd or impossible conclusion. 
 
It is this apparently brusque way of treating the skeptic’s arguments that provoked 
suspicion and even hostility towards the PCA on the part of some critics. Thus some 
have sarcastically referred to it as a ‘remarkably economical device for resolving 
complex philosophical disputes’ (Beattie 1981, p. 78), or as ‘a very simple way of 
disposing of immense quantities of metaphysical and other argument, without the 
smallest trouble or exertion’ (Heath 1952, p. 1). For others it seems to take the 
fascination and wonder out of philosophy by its summary rejection of intriguing claims 
and arguments (Watkins 1957a, p. 26). Why the defender feels entitled to treat the 
skeptic’s arguments in this way is explained in section eight. 
 
Defenders do not give the skeptic’s arguments quite the short shrift that these remarks 
suggest, however, since they see the PCA as being only a part of an adequate 
philosophical response to the skeptic. Accordingly, both Malcolm and Flew stated that 
to truly free us from the skeptic’s position, reminding us of ordinary linguistic usage is 
not enough. We also need to reconstruct and examine the reasoning (Malcolm 1951, p. 
340; 1992/1942, p. 123) or to identify the ‘intellectual sources’ (Flew 1966, p. 264) that 
drew us towards the skeptical conclusion. (The importance of this is especially evident 
in the free will debate, where even philosophers who sympathize with the PCA defense 
of free will can still feel troubled by the skeptical arguments.) This part of the response 
to skepticism involves examining the skeptical arguments, and it can also involve 
unearthing any unstated presuppositions, comparisons, or pictures that might be 
informing those arguments. Sometimes these sources get their intellectual power over 
us precisely from the fact that we are not explicitly conscious of them, and they can 
lose this power when we become conscious of them (Wittgensteinians sometimes call 
this the ‘therapeutic’ part of the investigation). For instance, regarding the argument 
that we never see people—a sort of argument that is not unprecedented (see Campbell 
1944–45, pp. 14–18; Descartes 2008/1641, p. 23)—the implicit assumption might be 
that in order to truly see something you must see all its parts or aspects, or the implicit 
comparison might be with cases of seeing a movie or a play, which one has not properly 
done unless one has seen it from beginning to end (if we miss a bit, we qualify our 
statement: ‘I saw most of it’). In sum, defenders believe that ‘the application of a PCA 
is only a begin-all and not a be-all and end-all of the satisfactory treatment’ of the 
skeptic’s challenge (Flew 1982, p. 117; 1966 pp. 264-265). 
 
It is also recognized by some defenders that identifying the paradigm cases of 
something is a far cry from giving an account or theory of it. If something is a paradigm 
case of an X it is so because of certain features that it has and does not have, and 
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philosophers often want to know what these features are, though they cannot simply be 
‘read off’ some paradigm cases. Identifying paradigm cases can then be only a 
‘jumping-off point for establishing the relevant rules and conventions’ (Black 1973, p. 
271) governing the term, and a preliminary to developing an alternative account of the 
phenomenon to the one implicit in the skeptic’s argument. 
 
 
4. Malcolm’s Version of the PCA 
A close reading of the literature on the PCA reveals that there is not one but two 
different kinds of arguments that go by the name ‘paradigm case argument’, the first of 
which is especially evident in Malcolm’s 1942 paper and which is of more limited 
application. Distinguishing between these versions is important as not doing so can lead 
to confusion in the critical appraisal of these sorts of arguments. 
 
The key feature of what we may call ‘Malcolm’s version’ is that it exploits the idea that 
there are certain expressions ‘the meanings of which must be shown and cannot be 
explained’ (Malcolm, 1992/1942, p. 120). Color terms are often mentioned to illustrate 
this; to make someone fully understand what ‘yellow’ means you must go beyond 
verbal explanations and produce a sample. Consider, for instance, a philosopher who 
claims that space and time do not exist. Malcolm first uses Moore’s method of 
‘translating into the concrete’ (Moore 1918, p. 112), where an abstract statement is 
considered in terms of its specific implications. Thus he understands this as amounting 
to the denial that anything is ever to the left of anything else, that anything is ever above 
anything else, that anything ever happens earlier or later than anything else, and so on. 
It is the denial that such states of affairs ever exist. Furthermore, for a philosopher to 
actually make such a denial (as opposed to just parroting words), she must understand 
the meanings of the expressions contained therein. She must understand what it means 
to say that one thing is under another, that one event occurred after another, and so 
forth. 
 
But how, Malcolm asks, could one ever have come to understand the meaning of such 
expressions as ‘after’, ‘to the left of’, ‘above’, and ‘under’? Only, he maintains, by our 
being shown or being acquainted with actual instances (or ‘paradigms’) of things being 
to the left of other things, of things being above other things, and so on (1992/1942, p. 
120). Therefore, for Malcolm, spatial and temporal relations must exist for us to 
understand the meanings of such expressions and thus, ironically, the existence of space 
and time is a precondition for the possibility of denying their existence. Or at least the 
skeptic owes us an explanation of how he can understand spatial and temporal 
vocabulary on the assumption that spatial and temporal relations do not exist (Soames 
2003, p. 166). 
 
The skeptic could respond, however, by simply denying that he understands spatial and 
temporal vocabulary. That is, the skeptic’s claim might be that such vocabulary has no 
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intelligible meaning, a claim which he perhaps misleadingly expressed by saying 
‘Space and time don’t exist’ (as misleading as it would be to say ‘Square circles don’t 
exist’, as if to imply that there is an intelligible description there that nothing happens 
to satisfy). And Malcolm does suggest something of this sort in saying that the skeptic’s 
real point is that these ideas are subtly self-contradictory. However, Malcolm claims 
that no expression that has a descriptive use is self-contradictory, and he maintains that 
these expressions do have descriptive uses. 
 
Taking their cue from Malcolm, some commentators have interpreted the PCA as 
applying only to expressions whose meanings are so fundamental or irreducible that 
they can be conveyed only ostensively (for example, Alexander 1958, p. 119). Certain 
defenders were then reproached for attempting paradigm case arguments with 
expressions apparently not of this type (Passmore 1961, p. 115; Watkins 1957a, p. 29). 
For instance, the most intense discussion of the PCA was in relation to the expression 
‘free will’, which should probably not be regarded as this kind of expression. It was 
noted that the meanings of certain expressions can be formed and learned by our 
associating them with an abstract specification or definition. In other cases, our 
understanding can be derived from examples, but examples that are fictional, like when 
we learn what miracles are by reading about miraculous events in myths and stories 
(Watkins 1957a, p. 27). In both cases it remains an open question whether the 
expression denotes anything real. Given that ‘free will’ could be an expression of those 
types, no inference can be made from the fact that ‘free will’ has a meaning or is 
understood by us to the conclusion that there is free will. 
 
However, a different version of the PCA exists that does not rely on the idea that the 
meaning of the relevant expression ‘must be shown and cannot be explained’. To see 
this, we will look in some detail at how the PCA works in relation to the controversial 
topic of free will skepticism. 
 
 
5. Flew’s Version of the PCA 
Next we will examine a particular application of the PCA, Anthony Flew’s use of it to 
rebut skepticism about actions done of one’s own free will, which we may call ‘free 
actions’ for short. By focusing on a particular application, and the one that has 
generated the most discussion, we can examine the argument’s logical features in some 
depth. The following quotations, then, are Flew’s presentation of it from his earlier 
papers on the topic. Though these were the most frequently quoted and discussed 
presentations of the PCA, we will see that they were problematic and that he reached a 
more mature understanding of it in his later work. These problems largely stem from 
clinging to Malcolm’s model of the PCA with a concept for which it is not appropriate. 
 
Crudely: if there is any word the meaning of which can be taught by reference 
to paradigm cases, then no argument whatever could ever prove that there are no 
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cases whatsoever of whatever it is. Thus, since the meaning of ‘of his own 
freewill’ can be taught by reference to such paradigm cases as that in which a 
man, under no social pressure, marries the girl he wants to marry (how 
else could it be taught?): it cannot be right, on any grounds whatsoever, to say 
that no one ever acts of his own freewill. For cases such as the paradigm, which 
must occur if the word is ever to be thus explained (and which certainly do in 
fact occur), are not in that case specimens which might have been wrongly 
identified: to the extent that the meaning of the expression is given in terms of 
them they are, by definition, what ‘acting of one’s own freewill’ is. (Flew 1955a, 
p. 35) 
 
Here is another more concise statement of the argument: 
 
As the meaning of expressions such as ‘of his own free will’ is and must 
ultimately be given by indicating cases of the sort to which it is pre-eminently 
and by ostensive definition applicable, and not in terms of some description 
(which might conceivably be found as a matter of fact not to apply to anything 
which ever occurs); it is out of the question that anyone ever could now discover 
that there are not and never have been any cases to which these expressions may 
correctly be applied. (Flew 1954, p. 54) 
 
There are at least two errors with this. Firstly, Flew claims in places that the meaning 
of ‘free will’ must be given by referring to paradigm cases. But this is not right. As 
suggested above, it seems possible that its meaning could be given with a definition (‘A 
free action is an action that . . .’). It would then be an open question whether there is 
anything satisfying the definition. Flew came to think that this ‘must’ claim was 
unnecessarily strong, and that for his argument to work it is enough that the meaning 
of ‘free action’ can be given by referring to paradigm cases (1957, p. 37). 
 
But secondly, even if the meaning of ‘free action’ can be given by referring to paradigm 
cases, that would not entail that there must be cases of free action (that is, Flew is wrong 
in saying that the paradigm cases ‘must occur if the word is ever to be thus explained’). 
For cases can be real or hypothetical, and it is not necessary that the paradigm cases 
occur for it to be possible to explain the meaning of a term by describing them 
(Chisholm 1951, pp. 327–328; Hallett 2008, p. 86). Indeed, even Flew himself, in the 
first passage, seems to describe a hypothetical case of a man who under no social 
pressure marries the woman he wants to marry to explain the meaning of ‘free will’ (at 
least he does not tell us that he is referring to some actual case he is familiar with). We 
all know that such cases occur of course, but it is a contingent fact that they do (our 
world might have been one where all marriages were arranged and obligatory) and that 
fact has no bearing on the pedagogical usefulness of the case. 
 
Thus it would not be the mere fact that the meaning of ‘free action’ is or can be 
explained in terms of paradigm cases that guarantees that there are free actions. It 
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would, rather, be the fact that the meaning of ‘free action’ can be explained in terms of 
certain paradigm cases, plus the fact that such paradigm cases actually occur which 
would guarantee that there are free actions. This two-step structure of the PCA is noted 
by Marconi when he says, ‘it is not enough, to refute skepticism about miracles, that 
the turning of water into wine would be ordinarily described as a miracle, for it is far 
from uncontroversial that such an event ever took place’ (2009, pp. 118–119). 
 
Flew elucidates the structure of the argument along these lines, and achieves a more 
mature understanding of the PCA, in a later paper. There he says that the ‘logical form 
of this argument type consists in two steps: The first is an insistence upon (what is taken 
to be) a plain matter of fact [that is, that certain cases exist or happen] . . . The second 
step consists in the assertion that examples such as those presented just are paradigm 
cases of whatever it is which it is being so paradoxically denied’ (1982, p. 116; also see 
Donnellan 1967, p. 108). Thus Flew’s paradigm case argument for free actions consists 
of two premises. 
 
P1: As ‘a plain matter of fact’, cases exist where a man marries the woman he 
loves and wants to marry without threats, pressure, or compulsion. 
P2: Such cases are paradigm cases of free actions. 
            Conclusion: Free actions exist. 
 
Here we can see that one of the premises is an existential statement, with the other 
saying that the thing quantified over is a paradigm case of whatever the skeptic is 
denying. In other words, one premise says that there exist cases matching a particular 
description, while the other says that anything matching such a description is a 
paradigm case of an X (where ‘X’ refers to what the skeptic claimed not to exist). 
Together they yield the conclusion that there are Xs. 
 
But that is not all, since the PCA is known to draw on linguistic considerations 
somehow. This is not evident in the above argument schema, so where do they enter 
into it? They enter into it, it seems, in justifying the second premise. Thus the defender 
will say that those cases are paradigms of free actions because the meaning of ‘free 
action’ is taught or explained with reference to such cases, or because we ordinarily say 
of such cases that the agent ‘acted of his own free will’. 
 
The justificatory significance of ordinary linguistic usage is discussed below. But now 
that we have identified the basic structure of Flew’s argument, let us first look at the 
various avenues of criticism available to the skeptic. 
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6. Critical Responses to Flew’s PCA 
 
a. Challenging the First Premise 
Critics of Flew’s PCA have tended to grant premise 1 as just being an uncontroversial 
empirical truth. Yet perhaps premise 1 could be resisted if we insist on understanding 
‘compulsion’ or ‘being forced/constrained’ in a particular way, such that any kind of 
deterministic cause ‘compels’ its effect or ‘forces’ the effect to happen, so that nobody 
could act without compulsion in a deterministic universe (see Beebee 2013, p. 110; 
Hardie 1957, p. 21). Here the analytic effort would move to the ideas of compulsion or 
of being forced, which would need to be clarified. So although the premise here is 
supposed to be a statement of plain empirical fact, it could be challenged through the 
development of a conceptual point. 
 
b. Challenging the Second Premise 
But the main focus of attention has been on premise 2. Are such marriages indeed 
paradigm cases of acting freely? Or if we tend to judge that they are, is this only because 
of certain assumptions we are making about those cases that were unmentioned in 
Flew’s description, assumptions that might be open to challenge? 
 
Some critics have argued that advocates of the PCA err by assuming a sharp distinction 
between teaching the meaning of a word by presenting cases and by giving criteria. For 
mixtures of these can also occur when we explain the meaning of a word with reference 
to cases, but cases that are interpreted as satisfying certain criteria (Ayer 1963, pp. 17–
18; Gellner 1959, p. 34; Passmore 1961, pp. 115–116). Consider, for instance, a 
superstitious society where people believe in miracles. There, when explaining what a 
miracle is, people might refer to cases such as when the leader suddenly and 
inexplicably recovered from a grave illness, and others involving a sharp turnaround in 
fortune, but it is being assumed that these turnarounds satisfy the description of being 
caused by the intervention of a spiritual being. Notice that here the meaning of ‘miracle’ 
is being explained with reference to real cases, but this does not prove that there are 
miracles. For the cases are being interpreted in a certain way and the interpretation 
could be wrong. Could it be the same with the marriage cases? Do we think they are 
cases of acting freely only because of some contentious background features that we 
assume to apply to them? 
 
This thinking is evident in David Papineau’s criticism of the PCA when he says, 
‘Maybe ordinary people are happy to apply the term “free will” to such actions as 
drinking a cup of coffee or buying a new car. But this is only because they are implicitly 
assuming that these actions are not determined by past causes. But in fact they are 
wrong in this assumption. All human actions are determined by past causes’ (1998, p. 
133). Similarly, John Passmore grants that it is natural for us to describe grooms as 
acting freely in the circumstances described by Flew, but he adds that ‘we have also 
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learned criteria: we have been told that a person acts of his own free will only when his 
action proceeds from an act of will . . . [with] the metaphysical peculiarity of being 
uncaused’ (1961, p. 118; also see Ayer 1963, p. 18; Lucas 1970, p. 12). Passmore’s 
implication is that in saying that the groom acted freely, we are implicitly assuming that 
he satisfied this criterion. 
 
Note that these philosophers are making claims about what ordinary speakers 
mean when they talk of free actions, and thus about the ordinary or ‘folk’ concept of 
free action, saying that it involves the idea of an uncaused or undetermined act. They 
are, in that respect, engaging in ‘ordinary language philosophy’ with Flew, and 
disputing his (more implied than stated) characterization of the ordinary concept. 
However, it is not enough for them to simply claim that this is a feature of the ordinary 
concept of a free action. There is an onus on them to support that claim with methods 
or evidence appropriate for this task. 
 
But what support could they provide? An old-school ordinary language philosopher 
like Flew would appeal to ordinary linguistic usage to support the idea that free action 
is, roughly, doing what you want to do without pressure or duress, pointing out that this 
explains the fact that we say of a groom who marries the woman he loves and wants to 
marry that he marries of his own free will, but not of the groom in an arranged marriage 
or shotgun marriage. As an old-schooler, moreover, he would be confident that he 
knows well what the ordinary use of ‘free will’ is just by being fluent in English. Others 
who think that philosophy should be more ‘scientific’ in its methods would think it 
necessary to gather some empirical data on ordinary speakers’ judgments through 
surveys. (Interestingly, one such study yielded ideas similar to Flew’s; see Monroe and 
Malle 2010.) However, Papineau’s and Passmore’s criterion—that a free action is one 
not determined by past causes—does not seem to explain this usage at all. For we might 
not doubt that in both happy marriages and ones involving coercion the groom’s saying 
‘I do’ can be causally explained—crudely, by love in the former and fear in the latter—
and that neither sort of explanation is any less deterministic than the other. We would 
not speak of these cases differently if this was our criterion of free action, and it is not 
clear what practical usefulness the expression would have on that understanding. 
 
Another kind of support for claims about what speakers mean or are implicitly assuming 
is the speakers’ own admissions or acknowledgments. When someone describes an 
event as a miracle, for instance, we can elicit his acknowledgment that in doing so he 
was thinking that a deity intervened. But will we be able to elicit from an ordinary 
speaker the acknowledgment that when he said that Debora married of her own free 
will, he meant that her marrying was not determined by past causes? Can we regard 
something as part of what a person meant in saying something if he does not 
acknowledge it as part of what he meant? Papineau and Passmore would need to allay 
the suspicion that their characterization of the ordinary meaning of ‘free action’ is an 
imposition from philosophical theory. It is not clear, for instance, where exactly we 
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have ‘been told’ the criteria for free action that Passmore says we have been told, 
besides in the philosophy classroom. 
 
Of course, these critics’ assumption that a free act is uncaused or undetermined must 
have come from somewhere, and Flew and Malcolm insisted that a thorough 
investigation of the ‘intellectual sources’ of the skeptic’s claim must be carried out, to 
identify the comparisons, pictures, analogies, and so forth that lure us towards it. Any 
PCA will seem shallow without this concomitant. 
 
To sum up, these ways of challenging the paradigm case argument 
involve contesting the defender’s claim about what the relevant expression ordinarily 
means. But this requires that the skeptic play and beat the ordinary language 
philosophers (in the wide sense of those who work on elucidating the meanings of 
ordinary expressions, which could include certain experimental philosophers) at their 
own game. Skeptics who dispute a defender’s claim about what ordinary speakers 
identify as the paradigm cases of something, or about what exactly ordinary speakers 
are assuming in making such identifications, must supply evidence appropriate for 
determining the character of ordinary concepts, a burden which, of course, also applies 
to the defenders. 
 
Another philosopher who questioned whether Flew’s description identifies a paradigm 
case of free action is MacIntyre (1957). Suppose we are told that the groom’s falling in 
love with the bride was due to a hypnotic suggestion (assuming such things are 
authentic). MacIntyre maintains that in that case, he would not have married of his own 
free will (though it could be autonomy that is lacking here, rather than free will; on this 
distinction, see Christman 2015, section 1.1; Piper 2010, section 2c). The defender 
would reply that though such an etiology was not explicitly ruled out by Flew’s 
description of the case, we were supposed to imagine that this was an ordinary case and 
thus that no such extraordinary things happened. But to this MacIntyre says that there 
‘is no relevant difference in the logical status between explanations in terms of 
endocrine glands [or whatever the explanation is in ordinary cases] and those which 
refer us to hypnotic suggestion’ (1957, p. 31). 
 
This kind of move—claiming that there is no important difference between putative 
paradigm cases of free action and of unfree action—is a familiar one from free will 
skeptics, and it is independent of the particulars of the paradigm case argument. It also 
leads to stalemate, since given that sameness and difference are symmetrical relations 
we can argue the other way around just as cogently: we can take our intuitions about 
the free action case for granted and say that because the unfree action case is no different 
in its essentials, it is, despite initial appearances, a case of free action (see Beebee 2013, 
p. 85). 
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c. The Charge of Irrelevance 
Other critics have taken a different, more concessionary approach to dealing with the 
PCA over the free will issue. Rather than contesting Flew’s characterization of the 
ordinary meaning of ‘free will’, they agree with it, but maintain that this is just not the 
concept of free will that is relevant to the philosophical debates. For instance, Danto 
agrees with Flew that ‘when, in ordinary contexts, we say that Smith married of his 
own free-will, we mean only that there was no shotgun being pointed at him by an angry 
father (or something like this). We do not deny that marriages are predictable, or even 
that this marriage was’ (1959, p. 124). We just mean that he was not made to do 
it against his will, pressured or strong-armed into doing something he did not want to 
do (Ibid., p. 123). However, ‘ordinary language so construed is simply irrelevant to the 
celebrated problem of the freedom of the will’ (p. 121), which is a ‘metaphysical 
problem’ that can be solved only with a ‘metaphysical solution’ (p. 124). Similarly, 
some philosophers have been explicit in saying that the free will that philosophers are 
curious about is not the free will that we speak of in daily life (Hardie 1957, p. 30; van 
Inwagen 2008, p. 329, note 1). Relatedly, others try to distinguish freedom of action 
from freedom of will and shift the debate towards the latter idea (see McKenna and 
Pereboom 2016, p. 10). The former idea roughly corresponds to what Flew was talking 
about, while the latter is supposedly something quite different and concerns choice or 
decision rather than action, and is less in common currency. 
 
Though the sharp disparity between the views of the defender and the skeptic would be 
well explained by this idea that they are ‘talking past each other’, operating with 
different notions, there is a problem with it. There is an unwritten rule (or a 
‘conversational maxim’, to use a Gricean expression) that we must tell our readers that 
we are using some expression in an unusual sense if we are doing so. This is to prevent 
misunderstanding and confusion, since we naturally interpret a person’s words to have 
their ordinary signification unless told to do otherwise. However, most philosophers, 
not to mention psychologists and neuroscientists, do not say that they are using ‘free 
will’ or ‘free action’ in some special or unusual sense in their written works on this 
topic. Thus, if they are doing this, then many of them are being irresponsible by not 
being upfront about it. This omission would be excusable if it were common knowledge 
that ‘free will’ is being used in some non-standard sense in the literature, but this is 
hardly true, especially considering that some philosophers have said the exact opposite: 
that in the free will debate we are investigating whether free will exists as ordinarily 
conceived (see, for example, Jackson 1998, p. 31). 
 
In light of these conflicting indications, it is simply not clear whether in the debates 
about the existence of free action it is free action in the ordinary sense that is being 
discussed. One way to find clarity on this, however, might be through reflection on the 
related phenomenon of moral responsibility. Most philosophers have not been 
interested in free will just for its own sake but because of its importance for moral 
responsibility, believing that whether we can be held morally accountable for our 
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actions, and can be deserving of praise and blame, turns on whether we can act freely. 
Thus, to the question ‘What sense of free will are you talking about?’, some might reply, 
‘The one that matters for moral responsibility’. However, this might not be of great help 
because even if there is some ‘metaphysical’ notion of free will that is critical for moral 
responsibility, the ordinary notion of free will is also important for it. For ordinarily if 
we are told that someone did something terrible, but are then told that he did not do it 
of his own free will, we will (if we believe this) infer that he is less responsible for 
having done it. 
 
 
7. "Ordinary Language is Correct Language" 
Let us look again at premise 2 of Flew’s PCA. This stated that cases matching a certain 
description are paradigm cases of free action. But how does a defender support such a 
claim? By referring to linguistic considerations. By saying that these are the kinds of 
cases that we ordinarily or standardly call ‘free actions’, or that these are the kinds of 
cases that we would refer to when teaching or explaining the meaning of ‘free action’. 
Furthermore, we can take the former to be the most fundamental consideration because 
the meaning of a term can be taught or explained correctly or incorrectly, depending 
on whether the instruction reflects the ordinary use, and besides, much of our native 
language is not learned from explicit instruction. 
 
But can we safely infer from the fact that a certain sort of case or thing is ordinarily 
called ‘X’ that it is in fact an X? It seems easy to find reasons to dismiss this principle. 
After all, didn’t people in superstitious societies ordinarily refer to certain events as 
miracles, or to the Sun as a deity, while being incorrect in saying those things? 
 
The idea that if something is ordinarily called ‘an X’ then it is an X was expressed by 
Malcolm in his statement that ‘ordinary language is correct language’ (Malcolm 
1992/1942, p. 118, p. 120), which came to be regarded as a central slogan of ordinary 
language philosophy. As a slogan, however, this needs deciphering. Malcolm explained 
what he meant in saying this by distinguishing between two kinds of mistakes that can 
be made when making a statement, being mistaken about the facts, and using incorrect 
language (1992/1942, p. 117). The distinction can be illustrated with a case adapted 
from Malcolm. Suppose that Jones and Smith see an animal in some bushes at a 
distance, and Jones claims it is a wolf while Smith claims it is a fox. After it emerges 
from the bushes, Jones clearly sees that it has the characteristics of a fox and that he 
was mistaken. This was a factual mistake. But imagine another case where they both 
see the animal clearly and are in full agreement on what its characteristics are, though 
Jones claims it is a wolf while Smith claims it is a fox. Though the form of their 
disagreement is the same as before, we now have a linguistic rather than a factual 
disagreement: they disagree about what a thing of this sort is called. At least one of 
them is mistaken about the meaning of these words. (Though Malcolm contrasts 
‘factual’ with ‘linguistic’ disagreement here, he would not deny that a linguistic mistake 
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is based on a factual error (see Malcolm 1940). That a word has the particular meaning 
that it has is, of course, a kind of fact. This contrast might therefore be better described 
as one between linguistic and non-linguistic facts, and one might want to press Malcolm 
to clarify it further.) 
 
But then Malcolm asks us to imagine the second disagreement again, though with Jones 
acknowledging that an animal of this sort is ordinarily called ‘a fox’ while maintaining 
that it is nevertheless incorrect to call it that and correct to call it ‘a wolf’. According to 
Malcolm, this would be absurd. It is absurd, he says, because ordinary language is 
correct language. To refute Jones’ claim here it suffices to say, ‘But that’s not what 
people call it.’ 
 
In his discussion of the paradigm case argument, Diego Marconi criticizes this view. 
He agrees that if some things are correctly called ‘Xs’ then they are Xs (2009, p. 116). 
But he disagrees that if some things are ordinarily called ‘Xs’ then they 
are correctly called ‘Xs’. For people might only be calling them ‘Xs’ because 
they appear to be Xs when in fact they are not Xs (p. 119). This seems right as far as it 
goes. However, if people are always calling some things ‘Xs’ because they appear to 
be Xs while not being Xs, then they are like Jones who called a fox ‘a wolf’ because it 
appeared to be a wolf to him: they are factually mistaken. Malcolm’s idea was that if 
some things are ordinarily called ‘Xs’ and if no factual mistakes are being made about 
them, then they are Xs. That is, Malcolm’s slogan represented an attempt to characterize 
a notion of linguistic correctness, saying that, assuming no factual mistakes are being 
made about it, the correct thing to call something is what everyone calls it (but for a 
hard case, see Watkins 1957a, p. 28). The factual/linguistic error distinction is 
indispensable for understanding the slogan. 
 
 
8. Ordinary Usage as Practices 
It is possible to gain a deeper understanding of why the defender puts so much weight 
on ordinary usage. But first let us return to an earlier point. We saw earlier that 
according to the defender, the PCA allows us to reject the skeptical position that there 
are no Xs without having to examine the skeptical argument. What is the source of this 
supposed imperviousness to skeptical argument? Can such an apparently dogmatic 
attitude be tolerated in philosophy? Consider again the skeptic who argued that there 
are no cases of seeing people. The defender responded by making the simple point that 
we ordinarily say that we see people in cases where we look at them clothed, cases that 
were deemed not to be cases of seeing people by the skeptical argument. But why 
exactly does the fact that we ordinarily say that make it correct to say that? And why 
should that ordinary usage be unassailable? 
 
The reason is that the defender thinks she is describing what could be called 
a linguistic practice, custom, convention, or rule. She is trying to point out that it is our 
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practice or custom, or a rule of our language, to call cases of this sort cases of seeing 
people. Now such things as practices, customs, or rules are open to criticism in various 
ways. For instance, a rule of a game can be criticized for making the game too long, too 
complicated, too inconvenient, too dangerous, or less exciting, and rules are sometimes 
changed to improve games along these lines. But it cannot be criticized for being 
incorrect, since practices, customs, or rules cannot be correct or incorrect. 
 
Consider the rule in chess that the bishops can move only diagonally, for instance. What 
sense can there be in saying that this rule is correct? It is, indeed, one of the rules of 
chess. It is correct to say that this is a rule of chess. The statement that this is a rule of 
chess is correct. A move may be correct by being in conformity with it. But the rule 
itself is not correct; it is simply followed, and its being followed makes it one of the 
rules of chess (though something can also be a rule in virtue of being decreed by a 
relevant authority, even if people ignore it). Admittedly, we might sometimes speak 
loosely of a ‘correct rule’. But ‘correct’ here is redundant; ‘These are the correct rules 
of chess’ is just an emphatic way of saying, ‘These are the rules of chess’. For we have 
no understanding of what an incorrect rule of chess would be. Would moving the bishop 
vertically and horizontally be an example? No, since we can reprimand someone doing 
that by saying, ‘That’s not the rule for the bishop’. (It would confuse him to say ‘That 
is indeed a rule for the bishop, but an incorrect one’.) 
 
So when a defender says, ‘We (ordinarily) call cases of this sort cases of seeing a 
person’, she is trying to say, ‘It is our practice/custom/rule to call cases of this sort cases 
of seeing a person’, and as such it is not the kind of thing that could be refuted by an 
argument. It is not something that could be proven by any argument either, just as a rule 
of chess can be neither proven nor refuted (though statements as to what are the rules 
of chess can be proven or refuted). Wittgenstein called this ‘bedrock’, where ‘I am 
inclined to say: “This is simply what I [or better, what we] do”’ (2009/1953, §217; also 
see §654). As practices or rules of our ‘language-game’ they are self-standing; they are 
things that philosophers ‘cannot justify’ in an evidential sense and must ‘leave as they 
are’. 
 
But if a linguistic practice cannot be correct or incorrect, how does this help the 
defender? For didn’t the defender want to claim that it is correct to say that such-and-
such a case is a case of seeing a person? Indeed, but note what she is claiming here: that 
it is correct to say that such-and-such a case is a case of seeing a person. The statement 
is what is correct here, not the practice, and it is correct by being in conformity with the 
practice. The point here is that though practices cannot be correct or incorrect, they 
are determiners of correctness. Thus a move in chess can be correct by being in 
conformity with the rules of chess, or a man’s manner of addressing the Queen can be 
correct by being in conformity with the accepted customs for addressing the Queen. 
Similarly, certain kinds of statements can be correct (not just grammatically correct, 
but true) by being in conformity with the rules of English. Thus the statement that some 
case, C, is a case of an X can be a correct and true statement by being in conformity 
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with the practice of calling Cs ‘X’. (To take a simple example, ‘This color is orange’ 
can be true and correct by being in line with our practice of calling that color ‘orange’.) 
And this can be a practice just because it is followed, because the relevant 
people ordinarily do it. 
 
Thus the paradigm case argument works in part by reminding us of what our linguistic 
practices are, practices that determine what it is to play the ‘game’ of speaking the 
relevant language, practices that the skeptic too, in unguarded moments or as a 
layperson, can be seen to participate in. This, however, is not to say that we should 
never break the linguistic rules that we currently follow. No prohibition is being urged 
here on creativity or novelty in the use of language; we are not being urged to never 
stray from the bounds of conventional and correct speech. The defender only wishes to 
maintain, against the skeptic, that calling certain things cases of seeing people, calling 
certain other ones cases of acting freely, and so forth, is not incorrect speech, insofar as 
it is in conformity with our linguistic customs to do so. Nor is it to deny that those 
linguistic practices can be criticized as problematic for reasons unrelated to correctness 
or truth, such as for pragmatic, moral, or political reasons. 
 
 
9. Conclusion 
So, does the paradigm case argument work? There does not seem to be anything 
intrinsically fallacious about it at least, but this general sort of question is not a good 
one to ask. First, we have seen that it is problematic to speak of the paradigm case 
argument, since two versions of it can be distinguished. But more importantly, it may 
be a bad question to ask because every topic to which it is applied may have its own 
peculiarities, such that a PCA may work in one application but not in another. For 
instance, we have seen that with free will skepticism there is a possibility that ‘free will’ 
is being used in a technical or unusual sense, which would make a PCA type of 
argument inapplicable to that topic, though nothing similar might be going on with 
some other topics. Applications of the PCA thus should be judged on a case-by-case 
basis. 
 
Assessing the influence of the PCA on the analytic philosophical tradition is less easy 
than it would seem. By one measure, that of observing philosophers explicitly using or 
referring to the argument and accepting its conclusions, we would have to say that its 
influence has not been great. However, it is unclear just how much weight we should 
put on that measure since, as Gilbert Harman said, a ‘philosopher’s acceptance of the 
paradigm case argument need not be revealed in any explicit statement of the argument, 
since this acceptance may show itself in the philosopher’s attitude towards skepticism’ 
(1990, p. 7; also see Gellner 1959, p. 32). 
 
For instance, this acceptance might be manifested in a philosopher’s tendency to treat 
things commonly or ‘intuitively’ identified as paradigms cases of an X as a datum for 
17 
 
the purpose of developing a theory of X (by, for instance, trying to extract necessary or 
sufficient conditions from the cases), despite the existence of skeptical traditions that 
deny the existence of Xs. It is not uncommon to see philosophers proceeding in this 
way (sometimes called ‘the method of cases’) in positive theory development. If pushed 
to justify this procedure, the philosopher could (but might not) resort to something like 
the PCA. Skeptics might insist that this philosopher has no right to assume that those 
‘paradigm cases’ are genuine paradigms without refuting their skeptical arguments. But 
defenders can attempt to turn the tables on the skeptics by requesting that they answer 
these questions. Any skeptical argument against the existence of any X must be based 
on some conception or analysis, implicit though it may be, of what X is. But how can 
we know that we have the right conception or analysis of X? Is there a better alternative 
to using the method of cases? And if not, might depending on the method of cases 
commit us to non-skepticism about X? 
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